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How Cross-Examination on Subjectivity and
Bias Affects Jurors’ Evaluations of Forensic
Science Evidence†
ABSTRACT: Contextual bias has been widely discussed as a possible problem in forensic science. The trial simulation experiment reported
here examined reactions of jurors at a county courthouse to cross-examination and arguments about contextual bias in a hypothetical case. We
varied whether the key prosecution witness (a forensic odontologist) was cross-examined about the subjectivity of his interpretations and about
his exposure to potentially biasing task-irrelevant information. Jurors found the expert less credible and were less likely to convict when the
expert admitted that his interpretation rested on subjective judgment, and when he admitted having been exposed to potentially biasing task-
irrelevant contextual information (relative to when these issues were not raised by the lawyers). The findings suggest, however, that forensic
scientists can immunize themselves against such challenges and maximize the weight jurors give their evidence by adopting context manage-
ment procedures that blind them to task-irrelevant information.
KEYWORDS: forensic science, bias, task-relevant, context management, blind, juror decision-making, bite mark evidence
People generally view forensic science evidence as trustwor-
thy (1). They think the chances of a false or misleading finding
are extremely low (2). It is debatable, however, whether forensic
science is always worthy of that trust. A number of distinguished
scientific bodies have criticized forensic scientists for relying on
inadequately validated methods, over-stating findings, and mak-
ing insufficient efforts to avoid bias (3–5).
Lawyers sometimes challenge forensic science evidence in
court, but judges rarely rule it inadmissible under the Daubert or
Frye standards (3,6,7). That means that lawyers who wish to
attack forensic science generally must do so in front of the jury
through cross-examination or presentation of opposing witnesses.
As the Supreme Court explained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals ([8], p. 576), “vigorous cross-examination, pre-
sentation of contrary evidence, and careful instructions on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”
Although cross-examination has been called “the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth (9),” it is not clear
how effective cross-examination is for challenging scientific evi-
dence (10). Kovera and her colleagues found that the strength of the
cross-examination had no influence on mock jurors’ evaluations of
expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases (10). Kovera, McAuliff,
and Hebert (11) found that cross-examination failed to sensitize
mock jurors to problems with the validity of scientific evidence pre-
sented in a gender discrimination case. But cross-examination some-
times makes a difference. Austin and Kovera (12) found that a
“scientifically informed” cross-examination that focused on the req-
uisites of experimental design sensitized mock jurors to a method-
ological flaw in a study presented by an eyewitness expert.
Lieberman and his colleagues (1) found that an “evidence-based”
cross-examination that focused on things that could go wrong in
DNA testing reduced the influence of DNA evidence, but only when
the DNA testing was done by a “low-reliability” laboratory that
lacked accreditation and had never undergone proficiency testing.
The experiment reported here also examined the effect of
cross-examination in a case involving forensic science. The
cross-examination was designed to highlight two common fea-
tures of forensic pattern-matching evidence—the expert’s reli-
ance on subjective judgment when interpreting data and the
expert’s exposure to potentially biasing task-irrelevant contextual
information. Although there is a growing literature on jurors’
reactions to forensic science evidence (13–15), relatively little is
known about jurors’ reactions when the evidence is challenged
by an opposing party (for an exception see [16]). This article
examines one aspect of that question, looking at how members
of a courthouse jury pool evaluate expert testimony of a forensic
bite mark examiner, and how their evaluations are affected by
cross-examination about the potential for subjectivity and bias in
the expert’s analysis.
Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic Science
In 2009, as part of a broad examination of the forensic sciences,
the National Academy of Sciences expressed concern that
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“forensic science experts are vulnerable to cognitive and contextual
bias” that “renders experts vulnerable to making erroneous identifi-
cations.” ([3], p. 4, note 8). This conclusion is supported by a
growing body of studies showing that forensic examiners can be
influenced by contextual factors that are irrelevant to the task the
examiners are supposed to be performing (17). For example, after
learning that the main suspect had a solid alibi, fingerprint examin-
ers were less likely to identify a latent print found at a crime scene
as having come from that particular suspect (18–20). Similar types
of contextual bias have been demonstrated in studies of document
examination (21,22), bite mark analysis (23), bloodstain pattern
analysis (24), forensic anthropology (25), and even DNA analysis
(26,27). Contextual bias has been cited as a contributing factor to
documented casework errors that have occurred in latent print anal-
ysis (28,29), bite mark analysis (30), and DNA testing (31,32).
Contextual information that is irrelevant to the examiner’s sci-
entific assessment, but potentially biasing, may reach the examiner
in several ways (33,34). Dror and his colleagues (34) present a
five-level taxonomy that distinguishes task-irrelevant information
that may be conveyed by the trace evidence itself (Level 1), the
reference samples (Level 2), the case information (Level 3), the
examiners’ base-rate expectations (Level 4), and organizational
and cultural factors (Level 5). In the experiment reported here, we
focused on Level 3—information about the case that the examiner
may learn through communication with detectives and other inves-
tigators or through access to police reports that provide informa-
tion about such matters as the identity of suspects, the nature of
the evidence against them, witness statements, and police theories
(35,36). Commentators have suggested that, without even realizing
it, forensic examiners may be influenced by such information, cre-
ating an unconscious contextual bias (17,35,36).
Concerns about contextual bias are supported by a large psy-
chological literature showing that human judgment can be influ-
enced by contextual factors, that people can be biased without
being aware of it, and that even well-trained experts are suscepti-
ble to bias (for reviews, see [17,35,37]). This literature suggests,
however, that the degree of bias in forensic science is likely to
depend on the nature of the forensic examination and the cir-
cumstances of a particular case. The influence of context tends
to be stronger when the data being interpreted are ambiguous
and weaker when the correct interpretation is more obvious (17).
Jurors should therefore be less concerned about contextual bias
when forensic examiners interpret data using objective standards
that produce clear-cut results (e.g., reading data from a computer
print-out and interpreting it according to a quantitative standard)
than when they interpret data according to more subjective stan-
dards that may be vague, idiosyncratic, or flexible.
It is doubtful, however, that jurors understand the degree of sub-
jectivity entailed in forensic pattern-matching methods, such as
bite mark examination. Television programs often make it appear
that pattern-matching tasks are automated (the computer screen
rather dramatically flashes the word “match”), when in reality the
conclusion that two items with similar patterns have a common
source is a decision reached by a human examiner following a
painstaking, subjective analysis. Consequently, we hypothesized
that cross-examination that reveals that an examiner relied, in part,
on subjective judgment, when interpreting data will reduce the
weight jurors give to the examiners’ conclusions.
Context Management Procedures
Whether jurors should be concerned about contextual bias may
also depend on the nature of the contextual information and how
the expert deals with it. Forensic scientists can greatly reduce or
even eliminate the potential for contextual bias from Level 3 infor-
mation by adopting context management procedures that shield
them from exposure to contextual information that is irrelevant to
their scientific judgment (33,36,38). For example, some laborato-
ries make use of a “case manager” who intervenes between labora-
tory examiners and criminal investigators (36,39,40). The case
manager works with investigators to determine what evidence
needs to be examined and then passes evidentiary items along to
examiners for examination, testing, and comparison. This division
of duties allows the case manager to be fully informed about the
background of the case while examiners are given only the infor-
mation necessary to perform the requested examination or test
(36). The examiners can eventually learn the background details
about the case, but only after they have recorded their conclusions.
One of the issues addressed in the experiment presented here
is whether jurors appreciate the importance of blinding proce-
dures. Do they give more weight to forensic evidence when it is
the product of a blind examination than when it is the product
of a nonblind (and therefore potentially biased) examination?
Previous research has raised doubts about whether people appre-
ciate the importance of using blind procedures in social science
research. Two studies have found that mock jurors’ evaluations
of the quality of a social science experiment were not affected
by whether the experimenter was blind to the expected results,
even though blinding would have been appropriate to prevent
experimenter bias (41,42). It is possible, however, that partici-
pants in these studies thought that contextual bias was unlikely
(or unimportant) in a social science experiment. People may take
the potential for bias more seriously when it could influence the
interpretation of forensic science evidence and thereby affect the
results of a criminal investigation. Moreover, their appreciation
of the importance of blinding may increase if it becomes appar-
ent that the forensic examiner relied heavily on subjective judg-
ment to reach conclusions. Hence, we hypothesized that jurors
would give more weight to forensic evidence when the examiner
was blind to task-irrelevant contextual information than when
the examiner was not blind. We also hypothesized that the effect
of blinding would increase when jurors were also exposed to
cross-examination that revealed that the forensic examination
required subjective judgment.
Arguments Against Blinding
Although forensic scientists show a growing awareness of the
problem of contextual bias (43), the need for blinding procedures
has been questioned (44–46). Some commentators have argued
that blinding is unnecessary because forensic scientists can resist
or overcome any contextual influences simply by being commit-
ted to objectivity and professionalism. A prominent forensic sci-
entist explained this perspective as follows:
I reject the insinuation that we do not have the wit or the
intellectual capacity to deal with bias, of whatever sort. If
we are unable to acknowledge and compensate for bias, we
have no business in our profession to begin with, and cer-
tainly no legitimate plea to the indulgence of the legal sys-
tem (47).
This perspective has been criticized as psychologically na€ıve
in its failure to recognize that bias can occur without conscious
awareness and can affect even well-meaning and conscientious
experts (36,48,49). Research indicates that people generally have
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a “blind spot” when it comes to recognizing their own biases
(50–52) and this appears also to be true of forensic scientists
also (43). In the broader scientific community, it is widely
accepted that individuals cannot be relied upon to correct their
own biases, which is why blinding procedures are used in many
scientific fields, particularly fields like clinical medicine where
reported conclusions often rest, in part, on researchers’ subjec-
tive judgments and evaluations (35,53).
A key goal of the experiment reported here was to learn how
jurors view a forensic science expert who claims to have resisted
or overcome contextual bias. Are jurors skeptical, or do they
find such claims credible? To investigate these questions, we
included an experimental condition (the “Ignored condition”) in
which the forensic examiner acknowledged being exposed to
task-irrelevant contextual information, but claimed that he had
intentionally ignored it and had not allowed it to influence his
judgments. We wanted to find out whether jurors would view
this expert as less credible than an expert who was blind to the
task-irrelevant information.
Forensic scientists who oppose the use of blinding procedures
sometimes advance a second argument: they deny that being
influenced by contextual information constitutes a bias (36).
According to this perspective, it is acceptable and even desirable
for forensic examiners to look beyond the physical evidence they
have been asked to evaluate in order to draw conclusions. If the
examiner is uncertain whether a fingerprint found on a murder
weapon is that of a suspect, for example, learning that the sus-
pect confessed to handling the weapon may help the examiner
reach the correct conclusion. As one examiner (quoted in [36])
put it: “how can it be a bias if it leads us to the truth.”
The problem with this perspective is that it allows forensic
scientists to be influenced by matters beyond their scientific
expertise. The forensic examiner’s conclusions no longer rest
solely on interpretation of the physical evidence presented for
examination but also are influenced by matters that have nothing
to do with forensic science. That creates problems for the legal
system because nonscientific matters, such as witness statements,
confessions, and the like, are supposed to be evaluated by the
trier of fact (i.e., the judge or jury) rather than by experts. Sup-
pose, for example, that a fingerprint examiner is uncertain
whether a latent print on a murder weapon is sufficient to sup-
port identification of the defendant as the source, but the exam-
iner decides to report an identification after learning the
defendant admitted to handling the weapon. To the trier of fact,
it then appears that there are two independent pieces of evidence
against the defendant—the admission and the fingerprint identifi-
cation. Because the two pieces of evidence are not actually inde-
pendent, however, they are not as powerful collectively as they
appear to be. The tendency to over-estimate the collective
strength of nonindependent evidence items is sometimes called
“double-counting” of evidence and is recognized as a source of
error in human decision-making (36,54,55). Page and his col-
leagues (56) explained the importance of this factor for forensic
odontology: “if a forensic examiner reaches a conclusion that
includes consideration of factors other than the evidence before
them, their conclusions should not carry the independent weight
that the trier of fact has assumed is inherent in such testimony.”
This creates a situation that Thompson (36,55) has called “the
criminalist’s paradox” in which the expert’s use of task-irrele-
vant information (in a misguided effort to make the “right” call)
undermines the value and independence of their scientific con-
clusions, making the forensic science evidence misleading for
the trier of fact. By trying too hard to be “right,” these experts
may, paradoxically, cause the justice system to go wrong
(36,55).
Recognizing this problem, the National Commission on Foren-
sic Science issued an emphatic statement calling on forensic sci-
entists to ensure that forensic analysis is based solely upon
“task-relevant” information (38). According to the Commission,
information is “task-relevant” only if it helps the examiner draw
conclusions “from the physical evidence that has been desig-
nated for examination” and “through the correct application of
an accepted analytic method. . .” ([38], p. 3). By this standard,
the suspect’s admission clearly is not “task-relevant” for a fin-
gerprint examination and hence is not something the examiner
should consider. According to the National Commission, contex-
tual information is sometimes task-relevant and sometimes task-
irrelevant. The Commission noted, for example, that “a finger-
print examiner may need information about the surfaces from
which the prints were lifted in order to assess whether discrepan-
cies between prints could have been caused by curvature or dis-
tortion of one of the surfaces.” Hence contextual information
about the surfaces is “task-relevant.” The Commission offered
several examples of contextual information that is “task-irrele-
vant” and hence should not be considered during a forensic
examination (e.g., of latent prints), including information about
the suspect’s criminal history and statements to police, informa-
tion about the suspect’s alibi, and information about other evi-
dence implicating the suspect ([38], p. 3-4). For additional
commentary on task-relevance, see (55).
Another goal of the experiment reported here is to learn
whether jurors recognize that it is problematic for a forensic sci-
entist to rely on “task-irrelevant” contextual information when
reaching conclusions. Do they give such conclusions less weight
(as they should)? Or do they see nothing improper about exam-
iners relying on such information? To investigate this matter, we
included a condition (the “Used condition”) in which the foren-
sic examiner acknowledged being exposed to task-irrelevant
information but claimed that it was perfectly appropriate for him
to rely on that information when drawing conclusions, and stated
that he had in fact done so. We wanted to find out whether jur-
ors would view this expert as less or more credible than an
expert who was blind to the task-irrelevant information.
Overview and Hypotheses
To summarize, we asked members of a county jury pool to
evaluate a hypothetical criminal case in which forensic bite
mark evidence was the key evidence linking the defendant to
the crime. A forensic odontologist testified that he had com-
pared a bite mark on the victim’s skin to the defendant’s teeth
and had determined “to a scientific certainty” that the bite mark
was made by the defendant. A defense lawyer cross-examined
the odontologist. The nature of the cross-examination was var-
ied experimentally. Half of participants received a version of
the case in which the defense lawyer began the cross-examina-
tion with a series of questions designed to highlight the subjec-
tivity of bite mark comparison and the absence of formal
standards for source determinations. For the other half of partic-
ipants, this line of cross-examination was omitted. A second
variable, which cut across the first, was the examiners’ reaction
to questions about his exposure to task-irrelevant information.
The examiner either denied that he had been exposed to task-
irrelevant information (Blind condition); or he admitted that he
had been exposed to such information but claimed he had
ignored it (Ignored condition); or admitted that he had been
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exposed to the information and acknowledged that he had been
influenced by it (Used condition); in a fourth condition (Control
condition), the defense lawyer did not inquire about whether
the examiner had been exposed to (or had relied upon) any
task-irrelevant information.
Based on our hypotheses, we expected a main effect of blind-
ing. Specifically, we expected jurors to view the forensic science
evidence as more credible and give it more weight, in the
“Blind” condition than in the “Ignored,” “Used,” and “Control”
conditions. We also expected a main effect the subjectivity vari-
able—specifically, that jurors would find the evidence less credi-
ble and give it less weight if they heard the cross-examination
about subjectivity than if they did not. Finally, we expected to
find an interaction between the two independent variables. We
expected the effect of blinding to be larger when the jurors heard
the cross-examination about subjectivity than when they did not.
Correspondingly, we expected the cross-examination about sub-
jectivity to be less influential in the Blind condition than in the
Ignored, Used, and Control conditions.
Method
Participants and Procedure
We recruited participants in the jury assembly room of a
county courthouse in a suburban county in the Southwest United
States. As jurors were released from service, the courthouse staff
informed them about this study. The staff members explained
that the study was being conducted by university researchers,
participants would be paid $10, and participation was entirely
voluntary. Interested individuals received a brief study informa-
tion sheet, and those who consented to participate were then pro-
vided experimental booklets to read and complete. After they
completed the materials, participants were debriefed, thanked for
their participation, and paid $10. All procedures were approved
by both the university Institutional Review Board and the county
Jury Commissioner.
Two hundred twenty-five individuals participated in the study,
of which 54% were female. The median age was 42 (IQR = 28).
A majority of the sample (56%) had at least graduated from a 4-
year college or university, and the median annual family income
was $60,000–80,000. With regard to political beliefs, 27% iden-
tified as liberal, 36% as middle of the road, and 37% as conser-
vative.
Participants read a synopsis of a criminal case in which a bar
owner was being extorted by a local gang for “protection
money.” After the owner refused to pay, an individual entered
the bar and discharged a firearm. The owner wrestled the assai-
lant to the ground, at which time the assailant bit the owner and
ran off. No DNA was recovered. Eyewitnesses did not get a
good look at the assailant because he was wearing a bandana
over his face. Police later located a suspect—a known affiliate
of the gang—who agreed to provide a dental impression for
comparison to the bite mark. An expert in forensic odontology
(analysis of bite marks) compared a plastic model of the sus-
pect’s teeth (prepared from the dental impression) to the bite
mark and concluded “to a scientific certainty” that the bite mark
was made by the suspect.
The experimental materials included a summary of the case, a
transcript of both the direct and cross-examination of the odon-
tologist, and a summary of closing arguments by the prosecution
and defense.
Experimental Design
The nature of the cross-examination varied in a 2 9 4
between-participants factorial design. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of eight possible cells. The first variable was
whether the cross-examination included questions about subjec-
tivity and lack of standards. For half of the participants (Subjec-
tivity-Cross condition), the cross-examination included the
following ten questions and answers; for the other half of partici-
pants (No Subjectivity-Cross condition), these questions and
answers were omitted:
Q: You decided that Stanley Wilson’s teeth are consistent with
the bite mark?
A: Yes.
Q: But that required some interpretation, didn’t it?
A: Well, yes, there is always an element of interpretation.
Q: It wasn’t a perfect match, was it?
A: There were eight clear points of comparison on which there
was consistency.
Q: But there were differences between the measurements you
made on the bite mark and the measurements you made on
the model of Mr. Wilson’s teeth?
A: There are always some minor differences when you compare
a model to a bite mark, but in my judgment the differences
were not meaningful differences.
Q: You measured something you call the inter-canine distance
on the bite mark?
A: Yes, that is the distance in millimeters between the marks
made by the upper canine teeth.
Q: But when you measured the inter-canine distance on Mr. Wil-
son’s teeth it was four millimeters shorter?
A: Yes, but in my judgment that could have been caused by
stretching of Mr. Johnson’s skin during the attack, so it is
still consistent.
Q: And you measured the angle of the tooth impressions made
by the incisors?
A: Yes.
Q: And again, there were differences?
A: As I said, one must make allowances for the elasticity of the
skin. And some of the differences in measurement were due, I
believe, to distortions caused by biting through the fabric of the
bandana. But a number of the measurements were identical.
Q: There aren’t any formal rules in your field about what consti-
tutes a match? You just rely on your own personal judgment?
A: There is no formula for what constitutes a match because
each case is unique. Like all forensic odontologists, I rely on
my knowledge, training and experience in the field to make
the right judgment.
Q: So it’s a match because you say it’s a match?
A: Yes. I’m a qualified expert in this field.
The second variable was the examiner’s reaction to the
defense lawyer’s questions about exposure to potentially biasing
task-irrelevant information. The examiner admitted that the case
file maintained by the crime laboratory contained a phone log
which included a handwritten notation saying:
Suspect known Crips gang member. Keeps skating on
charges. Never serves time. This time his gun jammed
while trying to shake down a bar. Bit the bar owner before
getting away. Murphy [the lead detective] wants to connect
him to the bite mark.
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The negative information about the defendant that is referenced
in the notation had already been presented to the jury as part of the
case synopsis, so the jurors already knew about it. The purpose of
this cross-examination was to demonstrate that personnel in the
crime laboratory also knew about it before the bite mark examina-
tion was conducted. In other words, the cross-examination demon-
strated that crime laboratory personnel had been exposed to
potentially biasing task-irrelevant contextual information.
What varied was the examiner’s testimony about his exposure
to and use of this information. In the Blind condition, the examiner
testified that the annotation had been made by an evidence control
manager and that, because the laboratory uses blinding procedures,
he had not seen the annotation (and knew nothing about the under-
ling details of the case) until after he had completed his analysis
and reached his conclusions. In the Ignored condition, the exam-
iner testified that he had made the annotation when speaking to the
lead detective and hence that he was aware of the information con-
tained in the annotation before performing the bite mark compar-
ison, but he claimed that he had paid no attention to this
information and that he had not allowed it to influence him in any
way. In the Used condition, the examiner also testified that he had
made the annotation when speaking to the lead detective and
hence that he was aware of the information contained in the anno-
tation before performing the bite mark comparison, but he admit-
ted that he had taken this information into account when reaching
his conclusions and offered the following explanation for why it
was proper for him to have done so:
It is important for a forensic scientist to take into account
all the evidence when analyzing a case. You can’t do foren-
sic analysis in isolation. You have to consider the big pic-
ture. If you don’t have all the facts you might miss
something important. . .. In order to get to the truth, it is
important to consider everything.
Finally, in the Control condition the defense lawyer did not
bring up the annotation in the laboratory notes and there was no
discussion of whether the examiner had been exposed to task-
irrelevant information.
In closing arguments, the prosecutor called the bite mark testi-
mony the key evidence and said:
Dr. Krauss made careful measurements and found that the
bite mark was completely consistent with Stanley Wilson’s
teeth. Dr. Krauss explained that bite marks are unique, like
fingerprints. The bite mark on Mr. Johnson’s arm was so
distinctive that Dr. Krauss could determine to a scientific
certainty that it was made by Stanley Wilson.
The defense lawyer asserted that the bite mark evidence can-
not be trusted because bite mark comparison “is not an exact
science.” In the Subjectivity-Cross condition, the defense lawyer
went on to say: “Dr. Krauss admitted that there are no standards
for what is a match and what isn’t a match. A match is whatever
he decides to call a match. It is all a matter of interpretation. . .”
(This argument was not included in the No Subjectivity-Cross
Condition). In the Blind, Ignored, and Used conditions, the
defense lawyer said:
Detective Murphy. . .gave the lab a lot of irrelevant infor-
mation about my client that had nothing to do with the bite
mark. He basically told them that my client is guilty before
they even did the comparison.
In the Ignored and Used Conditions, he went on to say: “Dr.
Krauss admitted that he talked to Detective Murphy and heard
all about his theories of the case before doing his analysis. He
knew exactly what he was supposed to find.”
In his rebuttal, the prosecutor responded to these arguments
by saying:
Detective Murphy didn’t do anything wrong. He just told the
lab about the facts of the case, which is exactly what he was
supposed to do. How else would the lab know how to test the
evidence? They need to know the facts of the case.
In the blind condition, the prosecutor reminded the jury that
Dr. Krauss had been blind: “. . .he didn’t even know whose teeth
he was comparing to the bite mark. He didn’t talk to Detective
Murphy until after he had reached his conclusions. So how
could Dr. Krauss have been biased?” In the Ignored condition,
the prosecutor said: “Dr. Krauss testified that he paid no atten-
tion to what Detective Murphy said when doing his analysis. As
a trained forensic scientist he knows how to maintain objectiv-
ity.” In the Used Condition, he said:
Dr. Krauss is a forensic scientist. He needs to consider all
of the evidence in order to reach a valid opinion. Dr.
Krause did what every good forensic scientist would do—
he considered all the facts of the case. As a trained forensic
scientist he knows how to find the truth.
In the Control Condition, the defense lawyer never raised the
issue of the expert’s exposure to task-irrelevant information so
the prosecutor did not present these rebuttal arguments.
Dependent Measures
After reading the experimental materials, participants were first
asked to state the verdict they would return if instructed by the
judge to find the defendant guilty only if the evidence convinced
them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the perpe-
trator. Participants then were given seven questions that probed
the credibility of forensic odontology and the expert himself. For
example, “Do you think testimony about forensic odontology (bite
mark comparison) is a trustworthy type of scientific evidence?” or
“Did you find Dr. Krauss’ testimony to be credible?” These items
were rated on a 7-point Likert scale with higher values reflecting
higher credibility. A reliability analysis revealed high inter-item
correlations for four of the items (in addition to the two aforemen-
tioned items, the other two items were: “Do you think Dr. Krauss
followed proper scientific procedures?” and “Do you think the bite
mark analysis in this case was subjective [based on personal inter-
pretation] or objective [based on fixed scientific standards]?”); the
other three items were either uncorrelated or negatively correlated.
A composite measure of the four items was created (yielding a
Cronbach’s a = 0.88) and z-scored to facilitate interpretation. This
measure is called “scientific credibility” hereafter. Participants
finally provided demographic information.
Results
Scientific Credibility
A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the experimen-
tal conditions as the independent variables and participants’ judg-
ments of scientific credibility as the dependent variable detected a
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main effect of the cross-examination regarding exposure to task-
irrelevant information (F(3,196) = 5.29, p < 0.001, gp
2 = 0.084),
a main effect of the cross-examination regarding subjec-
tivity and lack of standards (F(1,196) = 10.72, p < 0.001, d =
0.496), and a significant two-way interaction (F(3,196) = 2.80,
p < 0.001, gp
2 = 0.046). Figure 1 depicts the mean scientific
credibility ratings decomposed by experimental condition. Note
that we report Bootstrapped (1000 samples) means and confidence
intervals.
Bonferroni contrasts revealed that the Blind condition was
deemed significantly more credible than the Ignored condition
(mean difference = 0.57, Bootstrap 95% Confidence Interval
(CI)[0.204, 0.945], p = 0.02), the Used condition (mean differ-
ence = 0.744, Bootstrap 95% CI[0.335, 1.12], p < 0.001), and
the Control condition (mean difference = 0.58, Bootstrap 95%
CI [0.190, 0.944], p = 0.02). Additionally, participants in the
Control condition found the expert significantly less credible
when they heard the cross-examination about the subjectivity of
expert’s method than when they did not hear this cross-examina-
tion (95% CI for No and Yes = [0.35, 0.794] and [1.12,
0.358] respectively). None of the other contrasts were statisti-
cally different.
To summarize briefly, the expert was viewed as more credible
when the expert was blind to the task-irrelevant contextual infor-
mation than when the expert knew about task-irrelevant informa-
tion and claimed to have ignored it or used it. Raising the issue
of subjectivity on cross-examination only had a significant effect
in the Control condition, in which the issue of task-irrelevant
information was not mentioned. In that instance, scientific credi-
bility was significantly reduced when the expert admitted that
his analysis required making subjective judgments in the absence
of formal standards. Although it appears that the expert’s scien-
tific credibility is reduced if the expert admits either to exposure
to task-irrelevant information or to using a subjective method,
we did not detect a significant additive effect on scientific credi-
bility ratings when the expert admitted to both.
Verdicts
Overall, fifty percent of participants voted to convict the
defendant at the conclusion of trial. Figure 2 depicts the pro-
portion of participants voting to convict in each experimental
condition.
A binary logistic regression with the experimental conditions as
the independent variables and participants’ verdict as the depen-
dent variable was conducted to determine whether guilty verdicts
varied across the experimental conditions. The model was signifi-
cant (v2 = 23.34, df = 7, p < 0.001), as was the main effect of the
cross-examination on subjectivity (Wald = 11.77, df = 1,
p < 0.001). Participants who did not hear the cross-examination
about subjectivity were over nine times more likely to convict the
defendant than those who heard it (Exp(B) = 9.05, 95%CI = 2.57,
31.84). The main effect of the cross-examination about exposure
to task-irrelevant information was also significant (Wald = 11.70,
df = 3, p = 0.01); participants in the Blind condition were over
six times (Exp(B) = 6.01, 95%CI = 1.84, 20.32) more likely to
convict than participants in the Control condition. Participants in
the Ignored and the Used conditions were not significantly more
likely to vote to convict than participants in the control conditions
(both ps > 0.05).
These main effects were qualified, however, by a significant
interaction (Wald = 8.44, df = 3, p = 0.04). As can be seen in
Fig. 2, the cross-examination regarding subjectivity had a stron-
ger effect on verdicts in the Control condition than in the Blind
or Used conditions (Wald = 6.58, p = 0.01 and Wald = 5.84,
p = 0.016, respectively); however, the effect of the cross-exami-
nation regarding subjectivity in the Ignored condition and the
Control condition did not significantly differ (Wald = 1.61,
p = 0.204). In other words, the cross-examination about subjec-
tivity significantly reduced the likelihood of a guilty verdict in
the Control and Ignored conditions but did not significantly
affect verdicts in the Blind or Used conditions.
Another binary logistic regression was conducted, identical to
the previous one, except that it included participants’ judgments
of scientific credibility. The model was significant (v2 = 137.19,
df = 8, p < 0.001). After taking judgments of credibility into
account, there were no main effects of the cross-examination
about exposure to task-irrelevant information or the cross-exami-
nation about subjectivity, nor was the interaction significant (all
ps > 0.05). The scientific credibility ratings did, however, pre-
dict verdicts; for each unit increase in credibility, the odds of a
guilty verdict increased by 14.8 (95% CI [6.88, 31.91], df = 1,
p < 0.001). In sum, it appears that credibility is the key variable
driving verdicts. Our experimental variables affected the per-
ceived credibility of the scientific expert, and the perceived cred-
ibility of the expert is what affected the verdicts. There were
FIG. 1––Ratings of “scientific credibility” (z-scored) decomposed by whether or not the expert was cross-examined about the subjectivity of bite mark com-
parison and how he handled the task-irrelevant information. Bootstrapped (based on 1000 samples) error bars reflect 1SE.
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more guilty verdicts in conditions where the expert was more
credible.
Discussion
This experiment was designed to cast light on jurors’ evalua-
tions of forensic science evidence when that evidence is chal-
lenged through cross-examination. Specifically, it examined the
effects of two lines of cross-examination on jurors’ perceptions
of the credibility of a forensic examiner (a forensic odontolo-
gist), and their willingness to convict in a hypothetical case that
rested heavily on forensic evidence. One line of cross-examina-
tion concerned the examiner’s reliance on subjective judgment
when interpreting data. The second line of cross-examination
concerned the examiner’s exposure to task-irrelevant contextual
information.
The cross-examination about subjectivity consisted of ten
questions. The defense lawyer managed to get the expert to
acknowledge two key points: first, that there were inconsisten-
cies between some of the measurements made on the bite mark
and the corresponding measurements made on the model (which
the examiner attributed to elasticity of the victim’s skin); and
second that there are no formal rules regarding the degree of
similarity or dissimilarity needed to reach a conclusion. We
believe this line of examination made it clear to jurors that the
examiner’s conclusion rested on a subjective interpretation (one
made without the use of formal standards for interpretation).
The second line of cross-examination concerned the exam-
iner’s exposure to information in a laboratory phone log con-
cerning the defendant’s previous criminal history and gang
affiliations. It is similar to information from an actual case file
discussed by Risinger and his colleagues (35) as an example of
potentially biasing contextual information; it is also an example
of what Dror and his colleagues (34) call Level 3 contextual
information. The jury already knew about this information from
other sources (it was part of the case summary that they had
read), and it was all information that would typically be admissi-
ble in a criminal trial because it was relevant to the defendant’s
motives. The point of the cross-examination was to explore
whether the examiner had been exposed to this information
before performing the bite mark comparison. In the blind condi-
tion, the examiner stated that the information was known to a
case manager but had not been passed on to him—hence, he
was blind to it. In the Ignored condition, the examiner admitted
being exposed to the information but claimed he had ignored it.
In the Used condition, the examiner admitted both that he had
been exposed to the information and that he had considered it in
reaching a conclusion. Finally, in the control condition, this
entire line of cross-examination was omitted and there was no
discussion of whether the examiner had been exposed to contex-
tual information about the case.
Jurors perceived the examiner to be less credible when he
admitted having been exposed to the task-irrelevant information
(Ignored and Used conditions) than when he employed context
management procedures to shield himself from exposure (Blind
condition). This finding indicates that jurors have at least some
appreciation of the danger of contextual bias and give less
weight to forensic evidence that may have been influenced by
contextual bias. It suggests that the use of context management
procedures (blinding) may enhance the credibility of a forensic
expert in the eyes of a jury and lead the jurors to give more
weight to the forensic evidence.
Jurors also found the bite mark examiner less credible when
he admitted during cross-examination that his method required
subjective interpretation, relative to the conditions in which the
cross-examiner did not raise this issue. The strength of this effect
varied, however, depending on what jurors’ heard about the
examiner’s exposure to task-irrelevant information. The cross-
examination about the subjectivity had the strongest effect in the
control condition, where there was no mention of the examiner’s
exposure to task-irrelevant information. Just by asking a few
questions designed to reveal the examiner’s reliance on subjec-
tive judgment, and the absence of an objective standard for inter-
pretation, the defense lawyer managed to significantly reduce the
examiner’s perceived credibility and dramatically reduce the con-
viction rate. This finding lends considerable support to the the-
ory that jurors fail to appreciate the level of subjectivity entailed
in forensic pattern-matching tasks (unless it is pointed out to
them) and that this factor can be important to their evaluation of
an examiner’s credibility.
But the cross-examination about subjectivity did not signifi-
cantly affect the examiner’s credibility when the examiner was
blind to task-irrelevant information (Blind Condition). Perhaps
jurors’ underlying concern is not about subjectivity per se but
FIG. 2––Percentage of guilty verdicts decomposed by whether or not the expert was cross-examined about the subjectivity of bite mark comparison and how
he handled the task-irrelevant information.
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about the potential for bias that may arise when experts use sub-
jective methods. Hence, jurors were not so concerned about sub-
jectivity when they learned that the expert had taken other
measures (blinding) to prevent bias.
Cross-examination about subjectivity also failed to reduce
credibility when the examiner claimed that it was proper for him
to rely upon task-irrelevant information (Used Condition). This
finding fits the theory that the cross-examination about subjectiv-
ity invokes concerns about bias. By denying that the use of task-
irrelevant information constitutes a bias, the examiner may have
mitigated those concerns. Of course, this examiner (Used Condi-
tion) was still seen as less credible than the expert in the Blind
condition, which suggests that jurors were at least a bit skeptical
of the expert having been exposed to task-irrelevant information.
The cross-examination about subjectivity had a greater effect
on the jurors when the expert claimed he had ignored the task-
irrelevant information (Ignored Condition). The effect of this
cross-examination on perceived credibility did not reach statisti-
cal significance, but it significantly reduced the conviction rate.
Overall, the results indicate that jurors were skeptical of the
expert’s claim that he had ignored the task-irrelevant informa-
tion, and this skepticism increased when the expert also admitted
that his interpretation of the findings required subjective judg-
ment in the absence of objective standards for interpretation. The
examiner was less credible when he claimed he could avoid bias
simply by ignoring potentially biasing information than when he
had used context management procedures that prevent exposure
to such information. As already noted, these findings indicate
that jurors have at least some appreciation of the dangers of
unintended contextual bias.
From a legal perspective, the finding suggests that lawyers
can successfully challenge the credibility of a nonblind forensic
expert in two ways: either by revealing the subjectivity of the
expert’s methods or by revealing the expert’s exposure to task-
irrelevant information. When the defense lawyer in our case pur-
sued neither line of attack (in the control condition where there
was no cross about subjectivity), jurors’ perceptions of the
expert’s credibility were as high as in the blind condition. When
the defense lawyer pursued either line of attack, the expert’s per-
ceived credibility was significantly lower. But this was true only
for nonblind forensic experts. The expert was immune to both
attacks in the Blind Condition, where the laboratory employed
context management procedures to prevent exposure to task-irre-
levant information.
The findings on expert credibility are important because our
regression analyses suggest that jurors’ verdicts largely followed
from their credibility ratings. By raising concerns about exposure
to potentially biasing task-irrelevant information, and concerns
about subjectivity and lack of standards, attorneys can under-
mine the credibility of a forensic expert. And when the forensic
expert is less credible, jurors are less likely to be persuaded by
the expert’s testimony when reaching a verdict. The connection
between expert credibility and verdicts can be seen most easily
in a case like the one used in our experiment where the forensic
evidence is pivotal, but will likely be a factor in every case
involving forensic evidence.
Our findings support the theory that cross-examination can
sensitize jurors to the quality of scientific evidence (12). It is
particularly noteworthy that jurors appreciated the importance of
context management (blinding) procedures. Rather than produc-
ing general skepticism about the forensic science evidence, the
cross-examination reduced the perceived credibility of an expert
who had been exposed to potentially biasing task-irrelevant
information, but not an expert was blind to it. With regard to
blinding, our findings paint a more positive view of jurors’ sci-
entific sophistication than earlier work (41,42), which found
mock jurors who evaluated expert testimony about a social
science study were insensitive to whether the experimenter who
conducted the study had been blind to the expected results. We
suspect that lay people might find it easier to appreciate the bias-
ing potential of information about a defendant’s past criminal
history than information about an experimental hypothesis, and
that may be why jurors appreciated the importance of blinding
in the present study. Whether this interpretation is correct is a
worthy topic for future research.
Criminal defense lawyers may sometime face difficult choices
about whether to cross-examine a forensic scientist about expo-
sure to task-irrelevant information. Cross-examination of this
type may reinforce in jurors’ minds the existence or implications
of damaging evidence about the defendant. In some cases, it
might even require informing jurors of damaging information
about the defendant that they would not otherwise hear.
Suppose, for example, that the examiner was told that the defen-
dant had confessed to the crime, but the confession was ruled
inadmissible because it was involuntary. In order to inform the
jurors of the examiner’s exposure to the potentially biasing infor-
mation about the confession, the defense lawyer would also need
to inform the jury of the confession. We suspect that such a
strategy would do more to undermine than to help the defen-
dant’s case.
Jurors had already been told about the task-irrelevant informa-
tion about the defendant that was discussed during cross-exami-
nation in our experiment. Nevertheless, by questioning the
examiner about his exposure to this information the defense law-
yer might have reminded the jurors about the defendant’s gang
affiliation and reinforced that fact in their minds, which might
have offset gains that the defendant accrued as a result of this
line of examination. It is worth noting that the expert’s credibil-
ity (and the conviction rate) was lowest when the defense lawyer
cross-examined the expert about the subjectivity of his method
but did not cross-examine him about exposure to task-irrelevant
information (Control Condition with Subjectivity Cross). Future
research might usefully examine circumstances under which
cross-examination about exposure to task-irrelevant information
is effective, and whether it sometimes does more to undermine
than help the defendant’s case.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
We have assumed that the cross-examination in this study pro-
duced its effects by conveying information—by revealing to jur-
ors that the expert’s conclusion rested on subjective judgment in
the absence of formal standards for interpretation and by telling
jurors whether the examiner had been exposed to potentially
biasing task-irrelevant information. It should be noted, however,
that our experimental manipulations confounded the information
conveyed by the cross-examination with other factors, such as
the length of the cross-examination and the number of questions
asked. It should also be noted that our experimental manipula-
tion included differences in the lawyers’ closing arguments,
although the closing arguments simply repeated and emphasized
information conveyed by the cross-examination. The varying
effects of the cross-examination across conditions support the
notion that the manipulations were operating through the infor-
mation conveyed, though it is also possible that other mecha-
nisms were involved. For example, the cross-examination might
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have made the defense attorney look more masterful, or made
the forensic expert look defensive or weak. Future studies on
cross-examination might attempt to disentangle the effects of the
style, length, and content of lawyers’ questions from the content
of the expert’s responses.
Some of the terminology used by the expert and by the law-
yers in this study is less than ideal from a scientific perspective,
but was nevertheless included in the study to create a realistic
simulation of what jurors might hear in court. For example, the
expert testified (and the prosecutor emphasized) that he had con-
cluded “to a reasonable scientific certainty” that the defendant
was the source of the bite mark. The National Commission on
Forensic Science (57) has urged lawyers and forensic scientists
not to use the expression “reasonable scientific certainty” on
grounds that the phrase has no established scientific meaning
and is likely to be misunderstood in a legal context. The phrase
was still widely used at the time we conducted this experiment,
however, so we decided to include it for the sake of realism.
Another example of problematic terminology was the defense
lawyer’s use of the term “match.” The difficulties associated
with this term have been widely noted (58) and were illustrated
here, as the lawyer sometimes used “match” to refer to the
degree of consistency between the bite mark and a model of
defendant’s teeth (“It wasn’t a perfect match was it?”) and some-
times to mean a source identification (“So, it’s a match because
you say it’s a match.”). We recognize this use of terminology is
problematic but believe, unfortunately, that it is a fair representa-
tion of what jurors often hear in court, and hence was reasonable
for this study. Additional research on the way jurors react to
such terminology would, of course, be helpful.
Future research could also usefully test the generality of these
findings across different domains or forensic science. For exam-
ple, it would be useful to know whether the kinds of cross-
examination used against the bite mark expert in this case would
have similar effects in other pattern-matching disciplines (e.g.,
latent print examination; tool mark analysis; footwear analysis),
and when used more broadly to challenge forensic science evi-
dence. We collected the data reported here before the publication
of some recent journalistic exposes challenging the validity of
bite mark evidence (59). Nevertheless, it is possible that our jur-
ors were more skeptical of bite mark evidence than they would
have been of other types of forensic evidence and this could
have affected their reactions to the cross-examination.
Future research should also examine jurors’ views regarding
other forms of contextual bias. This study indicates that jurors
appreciate the importance of using a case manager system to
reduce Level 3 contextual bias arising from exposure to task-irrele-
vant case information. It would be useful to know, for example,
whether jurors also appreciate the importance of using procedures
such as sequential unmasking (60) or linear sequential unmasking
(LSU) (34) to reduce the risk of Level 2 contextual bias, that may
arise when an examiner is exposed to information about references
before interpreting evidentiary specimens. Our understanding of
such issues is extremely limited at this time.
Future research might also use richer stimulus materials, such
as presenting jurors with videos of testimony rather than tran-
scripts (see [61]). Replication with different cases, different stim-
uli, different experts (62), and a more ecologically valid
methodology (e.g., deliberation) is important and should be con-
ducted before strong policy pronouncements are made.
With those caveats, the policy implications of this study seem
straightforward. Lawyers who wish to challenge forensic science
evidence should investigate the degree of subjectivity entailed in
the underlying methods and whether there was an objective stan-
dard for reaching the reported conclusion. They should also inves-
tigate whether the examiner was exposed to potentially biasing
task-irrelevant information. Lawyers can sometimes find evidence
of such exposure in examining laboratory records and bench notes
(31,32,35,36). If examiners working in a crime laboratory commu-
nicate directly with criminal investigators, without any interven-
tion by laboratory managers, then it is very likely that the
examiners will be aware of task-irrelevant information about the
case. Our findings suggest that jurors will view the examiners as
less credible if the opposing lawyer can show through cross-exam-
ination either that the expert’s interpretation relied on subjective
judgment rather than objective standards or that the expert was
exposed to potentially biasing task-irrelevant information.
Fortunately, it appears that forensic scientists can immunize
themselves against such challenges by employing context man-
agement procedures that shield them from exposure to task-irre-
levant information. Academic commentators have long suggested
that forensic scientists make greater use of blinding procedures
in order to reduce the potential for contextual bias (3–
5,35,36,55). They believe context management makes forensic
science more rigorous. Our findings suggest an additional reason
for adopting such procedures—these procedures also make the
testimony of forensic science experts more credible in the eyes
of jurors.
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